Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be

here.

I am sure Secretary Pickering is shocked to learn that Saddam

Hussein is not popular with either of the committees that are holding

the joint meeting, and that there are frustrations with the

sanctions, that a silver bullet in terms of resolving that problem

would be most welcome, and that there are perhaps even divergent

and occasional parochial views on both committees.

Shocked though you may be, many of us are very pleased that

you are here. Your update on this situation is timely, and I look

forward to hearing from you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Pickering, the last thing I want to do is be perceived

as in any way, shape, or form supporting Saddam Hussein or any

of the actions he has taken or, indeed, of not being sufficiently encouraging

to the administration to keep the pressure on in every

way possible.

But a question does come to mind when you focus on the amount

of effort that Saddam Hussein is placing on getting rid of these

sanctions that are no longer working and eroding, and I do not

take issue with the fact that sanctions are eroding, and they always

do over time, and they are very difficult.

Let me ask you a question about sanctions generally. Are you

aware of other places in the world where critical U.S. interests are

involved where sanctions are working especially well and effec-

tively in ways that give no evidence of attempts to bypass on the

part of the rogue nation, or the leadership desired to be isolated?

Are there instances where sanctions have been a perfect force, or

are we, in effect, confronting a situation where it is not bringing

about the result we want in the timeframe we would like to have

it, but the alternatives may be even less attractive if we consider

all of the implications and consequences?

Is there any serious debate as to whether or not

the removal of sanctions is Saddam Hussein’s number one objective?

Let me look to the other side of the question.

Again, I feel a little awkward in the situation, because I have consistently

been advocated a tougher position in many cases than the

administration, or succeeding administrations have taken against

not only Saddam Hussein but others who have thwarted the will

of the international community in much the same way, but what

would be the effect if we were to end the food-for-oil program at

this point on the Iraqi people, and what would be the reaction of

the international community?

What is your sense, and I know you alluded to

this as well as to the ultimate effect, at least in a more cataclysmic

sense, of what would happen if the oil-for-food program were eliminated,

but what is your sense of the effect of the rather porous

sanctions effort that is taking place to date with all of the carveouts

that you alluded to in your opening statements?

How would you characterize the health of the people that the

food-for-oil sanctions, or the exception to the sanctions are designed

to assist, as compared to those that are particularly loyal to and

surrounding Saddam Hussein, to include the Republican Guard

and other echelons of society that he might favor?

In your judgment, is that program working?

Again, I do not want to get into a whole Iraqi frozen assets question,

but is that working?

Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

(presiding) Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I regret

that I am also now 25 minutes late for an appointment that I

thought I was going to be able to fulfill and missed one just before,

and so I will be very brief, and I thank you, gentlemen, Mr. Perle,

and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling the joint hearing.

It is an important topic. It is a frustrating topic, and I think it

is important that we engage in these discussions, whether we agree

or disagree with any of the points that are offered and made, and

I reluctantly come to the conclusions that are more in line with

some of the things that Dr. Pollack suggested are the inevitable result

of a lack of more desirable alternatives, but it is not very exciting

to say that you are a defender of the status quo, or muddle

along, or continued pursuit of something that clearly is not working

effectively.

But let me focus for a minute, Mr. Perle, if I may, on your statement,

and I was very interested in what you talked about, your 10

points. I knew they were going to be well thought out and tough

and provocative, and I followed along, with perhaps the exception

of a word or two I might have changed.

I was with you through the first six, even the seventh, if you accept

the premise of the first six as being one point following another,

whatever the case might be, but when you got to the eighth,

you said Saddam’s eventual political victory will be followed by a

restoration of his military power, and then ninth, only a policy that

is openly based on the need to eliminate the Saddam Hussein regime

has any hope of attracting sufficient support in the region to

succeed.

Those two were particularly interesting, and I would have to tell

you as well, in all honesty, when I turned to 10 and then I looked

to the next page, and the solution is—and there was no next page,

so I am pleased that you responded to the question about support,

at least, for a proposal that has been advanced by the Majority

Leader.

Let me ask you a question or two, though, about the reality, or

the likelihood of the reconstitution of the military. Would you give

me some assessment of where you think Saddam’s military in

terms of its ability and the threat it poses to external neighbors is

today, compared to where it was at its height, when the invasion

of Kuwait took place?

Which leads us to the ninth, and I do not quarrel

with your reluctance to assess a particular ratio, or whatever, to

the current strength as opposed to a former strength, or how soon

that would occur, or, indeed, that if sanctions were removed altogether,

the ability to reconstitute a more formidable force would

certainly be facilitated.

But in your ninth statement, only a policy that is openly based

on the need to eliminate the Saddam Hussein regime has any hope

of attracting sufficient support in the region to succeed, now, that

is the one I find most interesting and most difficult to agree with,

not because I do not think Saddam’s neighbors, like Secretary Pickering,

would not in their heart of hearts like to see Saddam gone.

The question is whether they are willing to step up and do anything

while he is still in power, knowing that the consequences

that might be visited upon them in the absence of some support for

others would be far more difficult than the situation that exists

today.

I understand the point you are making. What is

it that we have to do? Do you think simply suggesting that we are

going to support an opposition group, and if so, what opposition

group, what kind of support, and how do you equate that, again

without going into things that should not be discussed in open session,

with activities that have been widely reported in the last couple

of years in terms of other reported covert activities?

I assume you are making a distinction, but I am

curious as to what would constitute the degree of open support that

would bring us any hope of changed circumstances.

Although it has been articulated in ways that do

not come into conflict with our official policy of not sanctioning assassinations.

I do not think anyone in a position of official policy

has suggested that they look forward to continuing to trying to do

business with Saddam Hussein.

Let us assume that whatever words are comfortable

to you are uttered.

A Government in exile?

But that is the problem. I am not hostile to what

you want to do. In fact, I am supportive of what you want to do,

as I think you know, and I realize there are a number of things—

you cannot telegraph all of your punches in terms of some of the

kinds of things you would have to do to carry out that kind of policy,

but I am frustrated by the fact that we continue to offer this

alternative without a clear sense of how we could accomplish the

alternative, and that is what I would like you to address.

In the interim, you would not change what we are

doing in terms of sanctions? You would wait until that had taken

place?

Let us assume that this election takes place, and

someone is chosen by this constituted group to represent the preferred

alternative to Saddam Hussein. Then what do we do?

Would you envision a sufficient military buildup

in the region to provide that kind of support?

Do you think that we can engage in some kind of

sustained combat without having sufficient reinforcements available

to bring that to a conclusion if things do not go our way, as

our heart of hearts might hope?

But is someone going to have to physically stand

on the Basra territory before this dynamic occurs and, if so, who?

Which troops are going to accomplish that?

That is what I am coming back to, and again, I

am not hostile to your intent. In fact, I would like to find a way

to carry out your intent, because I clearly want Saddam Hussein

removed, and I think the vast majority here, but let me ask you

a question about what you believe, Congress’ willingness to support

an administration that would pursue the policy that you have just

suggested.

Is there, in your judgment, support, sufficient support to provide

the wherewithal and the commitment of troops and treasure, if you

will, to sustain that kind of policy?

But the inherent presumption is that all of the

necessary land muscle is going to be provided by someone else and

again, if we had that someone else standing in a queue some place

waiting to go in——

Having acknowledged that Saddam still possesses

the capability at least to constitute and deliver, if not nuclear certainly

chemical and biological weapons, and with concern about nuclear

that cannot be ultimately resolved either through generation

within existing resources or acquired through acquisition from outside

sources, do you think that the proposal like the one you have

suggested would result in Saddam’s use of those weapons of mass

destruction, and if he were to use those weapons of mass destruction,

what do you think would be the consequences for the region

in terms of either support or military activity?

Would what has happened with respect to the inspectors

in place, if not constraining the activity that he might otherwise

have carried out, have diminished his ability to deliver

weapons of mass destruction? In other words, would you concede

that some progress has been made by UNSCOM?

I do not think anybody expected us to.

Indeed, and as a matter of fact, we have had several

meetings, at least in the Foreign Relations Committee, I do

not know about the Energy Committee, on this very topic, and

some of you have participated in those discussions.

But the betting, if you will, at least from this side of the desk,

was that it would be a matter of months before Tarik Aziz or Saddam

Hussein or someone else acting in his stead declared that we

have played your game, you found nothing, it is time for you to

wrap it up and go home.

And that is the same advice you are going to be getting if you

go to Russia, France, and China may or may not come in, depending

upon whether or not the return head of State visit has been

completed.

I am not sure whether this is being carried live

some place, but I have got a call from an institution down at the

other end of the street, and I am not going to respond at this point.

The question of whether or not sanctions are effective to the extent

we would like them to be, I think there is a broad-based consensus

here in Congress and elsewhere that it is not.

I think I would challenge your suggestion that the administration

is fighting all efforts to change or to bring about a more effective

policy and, again, I have been as tough with the administration

over a long period of time in urging a more proactive, assertive

role for the United States in dealing with rogue nations in this

area and others, and so I am used to having my suggestions without

the same responsibility to follow through listened to politely

and not followed, so I am not without some concern there.

But let me—and I think you can sense from my questions here

that I am frustrated, like you are and like many others, that we

are not able to come to a more definitive result with respect to removing

Saddam Hussein from power and moving on, so that we

can address all of the humanitarian concerns that we know are

there in one degree or another without regard to pinpointing

whether they would be more or less if we took one action or another.

Let me, before we close up—and I have spoken exclusively to Mr.

Perle. Dr. Kay, would either you or Dr. Pollack like to have any

closing statement?

And Mr. Perle, I do not want to cut you off. Have you got something

you would like to say? I do not want to cut you off, either.

I will present that directly. I happened to be part

of a small group in the prior administration, right after the invasion,

that was invited over to consult on that question, and I

thought it was both valuable and politically wise.

Dr. Kay.

. I do not want to open up a whole new line of questions,

but if we were to support—in, say, Afghanistan we had Pakistan

who assisted in channeling arms and equipment. We did not

overtly send in the necessary arms, ammunitions, et cetera.

Would you, either you who are proponents of a more dramatic

near-term change, and if we came to that point, would you recommend

that we do that directly and overtly, or would you have

in mind some other ally that would serve that role?

The devil is in the details.

I think that is an appropriate place to conclude

this particular discussion.

Mr. Perle, Dr. Kay, Dr. Pollack, thank you all for participating.

This is a discussion to be continued.

This hearing is adjourned.